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ABSTRACT
Water trading is a potential means to improve the productivity of
developed water supplies and reconcile competing uses. Economic
theory suggests that markets evolve in response to changes in
supply and demand. This prediction is at odds with observed
disparities in the pace of market development in regions facing
similar pressures on scarce water resources. A dramatic example of
this disparity is found in the regions served by the California
Central Valley Project and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project.
This article argues that the differences in market activity in the two
areas can be explained largely by the underlying water allocation
institutions. The article identifies key institutional features that
affect the transaction costs of water trading and examines the roots
of the institutional diferences. The institutions governing market
transactions today are largely a function of pre-existing property
rights and political battles to build consensus and obtain federal
financing for the projects. The article highlights the path-dependent
nature of water allocation institutions and trading, but also
suggests that complex inter-regional markets could still develop in
California given ever-increasing competition for scarce water
resources and advances in information technology that lower market
transaction costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water trading is a practice of considerable interest as a means to
improve the productivity of developed water supplies and reconcile
competing uses. Standard economic theory suggests that markets evolve in
response to changes in supply and demand. As a commodity becomes
relatively scarce and the gains from trade increase, economists would
expect to observe institutional reforms that legitimize or facilitate trading.
These predictions are at odds with observed disparities in the pace at which
water markets are developing in various regions of the arid western United
States. In practice, the rate of transition toward water markets has varied
markedly even among regions that face similar pressures on developed
water resources.'
A dramatic example of this disparity is found between two United
States Bureau of Reclamation projects-the California Central Valley Project
(CVP) and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (C-BT). Most CVP water
trades are limited to short-term spot, or rental, transactions within the
agricultural sector, and a significant number of the trades are informal
barter exchanges among families and friends.2 These latter transactions are
more akin to borrowing a cup of sugar from neighbors than true, arms-
length market trades. In contrast, C-BT water is transferred in both short-
term rental markets and permanent sales markets within and between
agricultural and urban areas. Also, there are well-established market prices
and water brokers who mediate exchange between anonymous water
users.
3
1. See generally LOYAL M. HARTmAN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC
EFpiciENcY AND ALTERNAliVE INslm'iYONS (1970); BoNNiE COLBY SAuBA & DAVID B. BUSm,
WATER MARKETS iN ThEORY AND PRAcInCE (1987); Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars,
A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public
Interest Demands, 29 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 347 (1989); K. William Easter et al., Formal and Informal
Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBsERVER 99
(1999).
2. See generally David Sunding, The Price of Water...Market-based Strategies Are Needed to
Cope with Scarcity, CAL. AGRIC., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 56; Nicholas Brozovic et al, Trading Activity
in an Informal Agricultural Water Market: An Example from California, WATER RESOURCES UPDATE
(forthcoming 2001); David Sunding, Economics of Inter-District Water Transfers in California,
(presented at American Society of Civil Engineers Annual Conference) (July 1999) (manuscript
on file with author).
3. See generally Charles W. Howe et al., Innovations in Water Management: Lessons from the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Conservancy District, in SCARCE WATERAND
INsTrUnONALCHANcE 171 (KennethD. Frederick ed., 1986) [hereinafter Howe et al., Lessons];
Charles W. Howe et al., Innovatie Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potentialfor Water Markets,
22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439 (1986) [hereinafter Howe et al, The Potential for Water Markets];
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This article argues that the differences in market activity between
the two projects can be explained largely by the underlying water allocation
institutions. Four key institutional features are identified-the water district
structure, the water rationing mechanism, acreage limitations, and return-
flow rules-and the manner in which they affect the transaction costs of
water trading in the CVP versus the C-BT is analyzed.
The article then examines the roots of the institutional differences.
Did the projects initially adopt similar institutional forms and then diverge
over time, or did they adopt different institutional structures from the
beginning? The analysis reveals that the two projects chose different institu-
tional structures in their early stages, and those institutions have been rela-
tively impervious to change. The institutions that exist today, and thus the
differences in water market development, are a legacy of the initial in-
stitutional structures established during the formative stages of each project.
The decisions made then were motivated by the short-term goals
of building consensus between diverse interest groups and obtaining
federal financing for project construction. The different institutional
structures chosen in the CVP and C-BT reflected the nature of the federal-
state relationship in California versus Colorado, and the impacts of the
projects on landowners with pre-existing water rights. No evidence was
found to support the theory that the founders of the C-BT purposefully
created an institutional structure that would facilitate an intertemporal and
intersectoral water market as has developed. They designed a flexible
institutional system because it made easier the task of allocating the initial
water supplies to heterogeneous users. The CB-T founders were concerned
with the immediate problem at hand, and not the long-term ability of the
project to adjust to economic growth.
The institutional environments have remained relatively stable
because surface water users and other affected parties, such as adjacent
landowners who rely on recharge from imported surface water, have made
irreversible investments conditioned on the existing institutions. Some of
these asset-specific investments would become unproductive if institutions
were to change. Furthermore, compensation of these individuals by those
who benefit from institutional change is difficult due to sheer numbers and
imperfect information about the magnitude and cause of specific welfare
losses.
The framework of analysis in this article, while highlighting the
path-dependent nature of water allocation institutions and trading, suggests
that major changes could be in store for California's nascent water market.
Two developments underway at present, advances in information
A.ML Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural Characteristics ofa Functioning Water
Market, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 971 (1994).
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transactions are bilateral and personal toward the adoption of more formal
interregional markets. The arguments presented here also suggest that the
transition to a more widespread and active water market, when it occurs,
might not be gradual but rather rapid and drastic.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview of
the current state of water trading in the CVP and the C-BT. Section Il
conducts an institutional analysis of the water markets in both regions. The
section begins with a review of the literature. It then analyzes the water
allocation institutions in the CVP and the C-BT and their effects on market
transaction costs. Section IV examines the historical origins of the
institutional differences, and section V analyzes the process of institutional
change over time. Section VI provides a summary and conclusions.
II. THE STATE OF WATER TRADING IN THE CVP AND C-BT
A. The Central Valley Project
The majority of water market transactions within the CVP involve
internal water district trades.4 These intra-district trades are relatively
routine and only require the approval of the water district in which the
transactions occur.' Intra-district transfers are short-term "rental"
transactions in which the buyer receives the right to use a specified number
of acre-feet of water during the current season.6 Active markets in which
permanent water rights are bought and sold do not currently exist. While
the local rental markets may help farms adjust to short-run fluctuations in
supply and demand, the gains from trade within water districts may not be
large if the farms are relatively similar. Especially within small water
districts, farms often have comparable water rights and soil types, grow the
same crops, and use similar irrigation technologies.7
The gains from trade between water districts are potentially much
greater due to large variances in farm productivity and water supplies
across districts. Because the approval process associated with inter-district
trades can be complicated and time-consuming, most of the inter-district
trades that occur are negotiated by water district managers on behalf of
4. David Sunding, The Price of Water...Market-Based Strategies Are Needed to Cope with
Scarcity, CAL. AGRIC., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 56, 60.
5. SeeU.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Region, Central Valley Project Improvement
Act Final Administrative Proposal on Water Transfers, at http://www.mp.usbr.gov/cvpia/
Itrwt.html (Dec. 14,2000).
6. Seeid.
7. S. Hatchettetal., A RegiwnalMathematical ProgrammingModel to Assess Drainage Control
Policies, in THE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WAl1R AND DRAiNAGE IN AGRICULTURE 476
(Ariel Dinar & David Zilberman eds., 1991).
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across districts. Because the approval process associated with inter-district
trades can be complicated and time-consuming, most of the inter-district
trades that occur are negotiated by water district managers on behalf of
their farmers rather than directly by the farmers themselves!8 Some trades
between districts in the CVP and water districts outside the CVP have also
occurred but they require additional layers of regulatory approval.' Again,
most of these trades are short-term transfers of water use as opposed to
permanent transfers of water rights.10
In addition to failing to allow for efficient responses to short-run
supply fluctuations in the agricultural sector, the institutions and laws that
govern the CVP inhibit long-run adjustments to changes in economy-wide
water demand. The marginal value of water in municipal and industrial
uses is typically three to four times greater than the marginal value in
agriculture." Nonetheless, when municipalities have faced water shortages,
they have been forced to invest in expensive new water projects, such as
desalinization plants, instead of purchasing water at a lower cost from
marginal agricultural users.12
B. The Colorado-Big Thompson Project
In contrast to the CVP, an active water sales market exists in
addition to an active rental market in the C-BT. In addition, trades occur not
8. Interview with Jerry Butcher, General Manager, Westlands Water District, in Fresno,
Cal. (1994); Interview with Cliff Trotter, Manager/Engineer, Arvin-Edison Water Storage
District, in Arvin, CaL (1994).
9. SeegenerallyDavid Sunding, Economics of Inter-District WaterTransfers in California,
(presented at American Society of Civil Engineers Annual Conference) (July 1999) (manuscript
on file with author).
10. Id. Note that because an active market in permanent water rights does not exist, a farm
that sells its water rights is making an irreversible disinvestment. Given this irreversibility and
the uncertainty about the future value of water, which is driven in the short run by stochastic
weather patterns and in the long run by water policy and economic growth, a farm's option to
sell its water is very valuable. The more valuable the option, the higher the market price must
be before a farm will be induced to sell its permanent water right.
11. See generally SCARCE WATER AND INSTIrIONAL CHANGE (Kenneth D. Frederick
ed.,1986); Robert E. Howitt, Empirical Analysis of Water Market Institutions: The 1991 California
Water Market, 16 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 357 (1994); Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water
Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1989). Richard E. Howitt & Henry
Vaux, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES
REs. 785 (1984).
12. Richard E. Howitt & Henry Vaux, Competing Demands for California's Scarce Water, in
WATER QUANTrY QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND CoNFucT RESOLUTION: INsmTImoNAL
PROCESSES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 271, 278-81 (Ariel Dinar & Edna Tusak Loehman eds.,
1995).
13. In this section see generally Howe et al., Lessons, supra note 3, at 183-96; Howe et al.,
The Potential for Water Markets, supra note 3; Michesen, supra note 3.
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just within agriculture but also between agricultural and urban sectors. 14 In
the C-BT, trades occur in terms of "allotments," where an allotment is a
share of the aggregate project water supply for a given year. 5 If a water
user has excess supplies in a given season, he can rent his water to another
water user within the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
(NCWCD), the area served by the C-BT. 6 In addition, while the transaction
costs are higher, C-BT water can be rented to users not on the NCWCD
delivery system through a system of exchanges and replacements. 7 Rentals
of non-C-BT water also occur within and between ditch companies. Non-C-
BT rentals entail higher transaction costs than C-BT rentals, however,
because conveyance costs are higher and because they involve different
liability rules for third-party effects than internal C-BT transfers."'
The NCWCD staff facilitates rental exchanges by putting
prospective renters in contact. Occasionally an auction of rental water will
be advertised, but in most cases the parties to an exchange settle on a price
among themselves. In an average year, about 30 percent of the C-BT water
delivered to the district is involved in rental transactions.19 In general, the
agricultural sector is a net rentee and cities are net renters of water,
although cities have begun to use more of their allotments each year in
response to population growth In recent years, brokers have begun to
participate in the rental and sales markets.2' Some brokers simply link up
interested buyers and sellers, but others act as speculator-sellers. The latter
type must own agricultural land on which he can demonstrate beneficial
use. When opportunities to buy arise, the broker can then either use the
water to irrigate crops temporarily or rent it until a buyer is found.
When two parties want to transfer an allotment right, they must
submit an application to the district so it can verify that the water will be
used beneficially. ' The approval process is intended to safeguard against
speculative purchases of water allotments.' Municipal and domestic water
14. Michelsen, supra note 3, at973. The primary cities served by the C-BT are Greeley, Fort
Collins, Loveland, and Longmont. Fred N. Norcross, Genesis of the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project, COLO. MAC., Jan. 1953, at 29,36.
15. If a water user owns one allotment, his supply in year t is I/S, where S, is the
aggregate project water supply in year t. The allotments are defined in terms of "acre-foot
units." Michelsen, supra note 3, at 974.
16. See generally Howe et al., Lessons, supra note 3, at 183-96; Howe et aL, The Potential for
Water Markets, supra note 3; Midl, supra note 3.
17. Howe et al., Lessons, supra note 3, at 196-97.
18. Id.
19. Michelsen, supra note 3, at 979.
20. Id. at 975-76.
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company users are usually exempted from the approval process,
presumably because reasonable beneficial use is harder to define for non-
agricultural uses.24 Rental prices tend to be well below water allotment
prices, reflecting the fact that rentals carry a higher risk of non-availability
than do allotments. s In addition to risk factors, unwritten rules of conduct
between cities and agricultural renters exist that suppress rental prices. The
NCWCD directors have allowed cities to own water allotments in excess of
average use under the rationale that cities must have reliable supplies.2'
However, in return for this privilege, it is implicitly understood that cities
should not profit from rentals.' Most towns simply add a small
administrative fee to their variable cost when setting the rental price.'
The C-BT's transferable water allotment system has enabled
northern Colorado to adjust to short-run and long-run shifts in water
supply and demand." In response to urban and industry growth on the
eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains, NCWCD water allotments have been
transferred from agricultural to municipal and industrial uses. Irrigators
owned 82 percent of the water allotments in 1962, 64 percent in 1982, and
only 55 percent in 1992.? Municipalities and industries have been buying
the agricultural allotments to meet their immediate and future needs. Over
the period 1962 through 1992, municipal holdings increased from 18 percent
of the total to 41 percent and industry holdings increased from less than one
percent to four percent.31 Actual water deliveries to nonagricultural uses are
lower, however, because cities and multipurpose users have tended to
hoard extra allotments and rent water back to irrigators on a year-by-year
basis.32 For example, irrigators only owned 64 percent of the allotments in
1982, but they used 71 percent of the available water.'
24. Id.




29. See generally Howe et aL, Lessons, supra note 3, at 183-96; Howe et al., The Potential for
Water Markets, supra note 3; Michelsen, supra note 3.
30. Michelsen, supra note 3, at 975.
31. Id. at 975.
32. Id. at 975-76.
33. Howe et aL, Lessons, supra note 3, at 187.
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IIL COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Literature Review
Before analyzing the institutions governing water allocation in the
CVP and the C-BT and their effects on market transaction costs, a brief
review of the literature is provided. The review begins with a discussion of
the new institutional economics literature and the transaction cost
economics literature. It then focuses on the water markets literature.
1. New Institutional Economics
The new institutional economics literature is perhaps best
exemplified by the work of Douglass North.' He focuses on two key
questions relevant to this research: first, what determines the divergent
patterns of the evolution of societies over time? and second, how can we
account for the survival of economies with persistently poor performance
over long periods of time? In answering these questions, North emphasizes
the importance of history. If institutions existed in a world with zero
transaction costs, history would not matter because institutions would
adjust instantaneously in response to changes in relative prices or
preferences. However, since in reality there are positive transaction costs,
history matters. North argues that the two main forces determining the path
of institutional change are increasing returns to scale and imperfect markets
characterized by significant transaction costs.'
North describes general stages of market evolution, from local, to
regional, to long-distance exchange, involving progressively more
specialization and complex trading relationships.' The movement from one
34. See generally DOUGLAS C. NORM, INS [TIr oNS, INSTMMONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOaCPERFoRMANCE(1990); Douglass C. North, Economic Performance through Time, 64AM.
ECON. REv. 359 (1994); EMiucALSTUDIES i IN b ONAL CHANGE (Lee J. Aiston et aL eds.,
1996).
35. DOUGLASs C. NORTH, INSlTIw ONS, INSmITTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFuORMANCE 7-10(1990).
36. In the first stage, there is local exchange characterized by little specialization, strong
social networks, informal constraints, and low transaction costs. In the second stage, there is
regional exchange with specialized trading centers, growth in multilateral trade, and an
increased percentage of the population engaged in trade and commerce. As the size of the
market grows, the costs of transacting also increase. Dense social networks are replaced by a
greater reliance on anonymous transactions, and more resources are devoted to measurement
and enforcement. In the third stage, there is long-distance trade that involves a distinct change
in the economic structure. One observes substantial specialization, individuals whose
livelihoods are confined to trading, trading centers, economies of scale, and geographical and
occupational specialization. Long-distance trade requires the development of standardized
weights and measures, units of account, a medium of exchange, merchant-law courts, and a
[Vol. 41
EMERGING MARKETS IN WATER
stage to the next requires institutional and technological innovations that
lower the costs of transacting. However, the change necessary for the
evolution from one stage to the next will not necessarily occur. The
institutional environment will be stable, North says, if the skill and
knowledge required for success by organizations and individuals does not
induce productive modifications of the basic institutional framework. In
such cases of "allocative efficiency," change will occur only if it is
stimulated by external forces. In contrast, when there is "adaptive
efficiency," sequentially more complex institutional innovations evolve to
lower the cost of transacting.Y
The study of institutional change is closely related to work by Paul
David and W. Brian Arthur on the path dependency of technological
choices.' David illustrates the process of path dependence with an analysis
of the history of the QWERTY keyboard system. Although other keyboard
systems developed around the same time were shown in speed tests to be
more efficient, the QWERTY system became the standard." Arthur
describes a similar process of incremental technological change. He argues
that if there are large setup or fixed costs, learning effects, coordination
effects, and adaptive expectations, there may be multiple equilibria,
possible inefficiencies, lock-in, and path dependencec Both David and
Arthur focus on technology adoption, but their insights are equally relevant
to the process of institutional change in water.
whole range of other organizations, institutions, and instruments. These developments are
necessary to mitigate the transaction costs associated with problems of agency and contract
enforcement. In the fourth stage, there are more specialized producers, increasing economies
of scale, and urbanization. This stage requires the development of capital markets,
manufacturing firms, and political and judicial organizations that can enforce contracts in
order to ensure secure property rights. In the final stage, an even larger percentage of the
resources of the society are engaged in transacting due to increased specialization. Ia. at 120-22;
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance through Time, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 359 (1994).
37. As an example of adaptive efficiency, North describes the development of long
distance trade in Europe. Long distance trade became possible due to the development of
institutional and technological innovations that increased the mobility of capital, lowered
information costs, and spread risk. Douglass C. North & Barry I. Weingast, Constitutions and
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions GoverningPublic Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,
in EMPIRICAL STuxE IN INsTrnONALCHANGE 147 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996).
38. See generally Paul David, Understanding the Economics of QUERTY, in ECONOMIc
HISTORY AND THE M opsN ECONOMIST 30 (William N. Parker ed., 1986); W. Brian Arthur,
Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events, 99ECON.J. 116 (1989).
39. David argues that the adoption and subsequent standardization of an inefficient
system was possible due to the following key features of the evolving product system: (1)
technical inter-relatedness, (2) economies of scale, and (3) the quasi-irreversibility of
investmenL He claims that the "QWERTY phenomenon," in which an industry becomes
locked-in to the wrong system, is not as uncommon as people may believe. David, supra note
38, at 30.
40. Arthur, supra note 38, at 126-28.
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2. Transaction Cost Economics
The analysis of the CVP and the C-BT also draws from the
transaction cost economics literature originally developed by Oliver E.
Williamson.41 Transaction cost economics advocates comparative
institutional analysis as opposed to a comparison of the status quo with an
unattainable "first best." It analyzes why various governance structures
emerge and how they adapt in response to the challenge of mitigating
transaction costs. The relevant transaction costs include both the ex-ante
costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, and the ex-
post costs associated with contractual breakdowns and rent seeking
behavior.42
Transaction cost economics assumes that agents are subject to
bounded rationality and are given to opportunism.' This theory argues that
the most critical dimension of transactions is the degree of asset specificity."
Transaction cost economics assumes that uncertainty is present in a non-
trivial degree and analyzes the effects of bounded rationality, opportunism,
asset specificity, and frequency on the structure of contracts. Transaction
cost economics argues that transactions will be organized so as to
economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the
transactions against the hazards of opportunism. Furthermore, there will be
competition among organizational forms, and through an evolutionary
process efficient forms should prevail.
Avinash K. Dixit uses transaction cost economics to model the
political process in a theory he calls "transaction cost politics.'" He views
economic policymaking as a dynamic game, played under conditions of
uncertainty. Rather than thinking of a social planner who maximizes a
social welfare function, he envisions multiple agents engaged in a game in
which each policy act is a play of the game within an existing set of rules
and institutions." In addition, each agent has some leeway to make strategic
41. SeegenerallyOuvERE.WILLASON,THEEcoNoMIcJNsmn UoIsOFCAfTALiSM(1985)
[hereinafter WILuAMSON, ImuoNS]. OLIV E. WnIAmSO, THE MHANMS OF
GOVERNANCE (1996).
42. WLIIAmSON, bInfiONs, supra note 41, at 20-21.
43. Id. at 43-52.
44. Id. at 52-56.
45. See generally AVINASH K. DIXlT, THE MAKING OF E ONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACION-
COST PoLIrcs PERSpFECIVE (1996).
46. Id. at 8-9,145-46.
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moves that may affect or alter future rules or institutions. Given this
framework, Dixit (like North) argues that institutions are not necessarily
created to be socially efficient, but rather they are created to serve the
interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.4 Out of
new institutions arise new organizations that have an interest in
maintaining the status quo. As more people make sunk investments based
on the current set of institutions, it becomes politically and economically
more difficult to change a policy act. Thus, there is a hysteresis of policy
acts. With reference to Williamson's idea of the natural selection of efficient
organizational forms, Dixit argues that in politics the forces of selection and
evolution are weaker and slower than in private business, so the
presumption of efficiency must also be weaker.49 Finally, when evaluating
the performance of a policy, Dixit asserts that one should look at efficiency
over the life of a project, not just at a given point of time?0 There is value
associated with adaptability.
3. Water Marketing
Economists have long argued that markets are an efficient way to
allocate water resources. There are by.now a large number of theoretical
and empirical studies purporting to measure the efficiency gains to various
groups and to society as a whole from water trading. For example, Henry
Vaux and Richard E. Howitt measure the gain in economic welfare from
allowing interregional transfers of water in California."' They conclude that
the gains are significant, and that only relatively modest transfers of water
from agriculture to urban areas (around 10 percent) would be needed to
bring the allocation among developed uses into economic balance.52
Another benefit of water trading, which is especially important
given emerging public preferences for the restoration of American rivers,
is the complementarity between water trading and policies to improve
environmental quality. In a recent study, David Sunding et at. point out that
47. Dixit distinguishes between policy rules (which he compares to fixed inputs such as
capital) and policy acts (which he compares to variable inputs such as labor). Policy acts can
be changed in the short run, while policy rules can be changed in the long run and require a
lump-sum up-front cost. However, he says the distinction betweenpolicy rules and policy acts
is one of degree rather than one of kind, since rules are subject to erosion and reinterpretation
and acts can create durable institutions. Id. at 144.
48. Id. at 8-12.
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id, at 59-60.
51. Howitt & Vaux, supra note 11, at 785. See generally HAR7MAN & SEASTONE, supra note
1; RODNEY T. SImiT- TRADING WATER: AN BCONOMZC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER
MARxEmNG (1988); RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKm FOR FEDERAL WATE: SUBsIDIm, PRoPmRT
RIGHi, ANO THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989); Howitt, supra note 11.
52. Vaux & Howitt, supra note 11, at 790-91.
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water markets can greatly reduce the burden of improving instream water
quality by allocating reductions in diversions to users with the lowest
economic productivity. 3 Using data from California's Central Valley, they
find that economic costs of pre-determined San Francisco Bay/Delta water
quality enhancements can be cut nearly in half if trading is allowed between
the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. '
Economists have also noted that water trading has the potential to
allocate other important resources, including risk. H. Stuart Bumess and
James P. Quirk have shown that by creating differences in water availability
over time, the prior appropriation system unequally and inefficiently
allocates risk among otherwise similar water users.0 They argue that water
markets can improve economic welfare by reallocating both water and risk
according to the productivity of water use and relative risk preferences.5
Given the potential benefits of water markets, many analysts have
asked why more water trading does not occur.57 Bonnie Colby Saliba and
David B. Bush surveyed water markets in the Southwest and concluded
that, actually, quite a few water markets exist, but most are local and
informal in nature. ' K. William Easter et al. surveyed water markets in a
number of countries, including the United States." Like Saliba and Bush,
the Easter et al. survey demonstrates that, while many informal water
markets exist throughout the world, more formal markets, such as exist for
C-BT water, are the exception rather than the rule.' Informal local markets
are advantaged relative to inter-regional markets since they do not
encounter as many legal and bureaucratic restrictions." In local markets,
water does not have to be transported long distances and third party effects
maybe less if water stays in the same groundwater basin. To the extent that
transfers generate negative externalities, compensation of third parties may
be more likely if the market participants are neighbors (as in local markets)
whose long-term reputations are at stake.
53. See generally David Sunding et al., Measuring the Cost of Reallocating Water from
Agriculture to the Environment: A Multi-Model Approach, NAT. RESOURCES MODEuNG
(forthcoming 2001).
54. Id.
55. H. Stuart Burness &Jarnes P. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency:
The Colorado River, 23 J.L & ECON. 111, 120-21 (1980).
56. Id. at 121-22.
57. See generally Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few Transactions among Water Users?,
68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1143 (1986).
58. See generally SABISA & BUSH, supra note 1.
59. See generally MARRm FOR WATER; POTENTAL AND PEtFORMANcE (K. William Easter
et al. eds., 1998).
60. See K. William Easter et al., The Future of Water Markets: A Realistic Perspective, in
MARKMi FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 277 (K. William Easter et al. eds., 1998).
61. Id. at 279-80.
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Loyal Hartman and Don Seastone point to other reasons why
formal water markets have failed to develop'They argue that the physical
characteristics of water, namely the stochastic nature of its supply and the
complexity of the natural and manmade systems through which it flows,
give rise to the special difficulties of establishing markets in water.' They
analyze the external impacts of transfers with a special focus on return
flows and the effects of transfers on local economies." Hartman and
Seastone argue that institutional change involving both laws and
organizations is necessary for economic growth to occur.'
Much of the literature on water trading attempts to define the
desirable characteristics of markets. Primary in most papers is a discussion
of the need for balance between minimizing transaction costs to encourage
efficiency-enhancing transfers and protecting third parties." The debate
hinges on the nature of the "right" balance. If there is too much regulation,
many desirable transactions will not occur. If there is too little regulation,
excessive costs may be imposed on third parties and the net social benefits
of transfers may be negative.
Bonnie G. Colby argues that the tension between market-oriented
and regulatory approaches to resource allocation stems from disagreements
over the appropriate balance between market forces and laws promulgated
to protect or enhance broader social values in water? Colby views
transaction costs not as the inefficient consequences of regulation but as the
costs incurred to comply with policies designed to account for
62. See generally HARTMAN & SASTONE, supra note 1.
63. See id. at 119-20.
64. See id. at 8-13. For another examination of the potential negative impacts of water
transfers on local economies, see -LAwRUE J. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO
SusTANAsRnY: WATER, AGRtcuLn , ANDTH ENvIRONMENT IN THE AmmCAN WEST (2000).
MacDonnell describes the negative impacts that long-term sales of water rights to Denver
metro communities have had on farm communities in the Arkansas River Valley. While the
water transfers were welfare enhanc in terms of the creationof jobs statewide, the local farm
economies were harmed. Id. at 51-60. MacDonnell argues, however, that these Arkansas River
transfers do not constitute evidence that water markets do not work. These types of transfers
should not be called "water marketing," he argues, because no true market exists in which
water is bought and sold. MacDonnell supports institutional reforms that encourage the
establishment of well-functioning markets. He states that someportion of already developed
and used supplies must shift to new uses. The existing procedures are cumbersome and
expensive and often produce undesired results.
65. HARTMAN &SEASMONE, supra note 1, at 120-22.
66. See generally id.; Howe et al., The Potentid for Water Markets, supra note 3; Bonnie G.
Colby, Regulation, Imperfect Markets, and Transaction Costs: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in
Water Allocation, in THE HANBOOK O ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (Daniel W. Bromley ed.,
1995).
67. Colby, supra note 66, at 476.
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externalities.' She says transaction costs reflect the costs associated with
gathering information and the need for hydrologic, legal, and economic
data to address externalities in an efficient manner.' Colby argues that since
appropriately structured transaction costs give transacting parties an
incentive to account for the social costs of transfers, public policy should not
necessarily attempt to minimize transaction costs."°
Terry L. Anderson and Pamela Snyder advocate less government
intervention.71 They acknowledge three rationales for government
involvement in the allocation of water: monopoly, imperfect capital
markets, and externalities.' They believe the most legitimate concern is
externalities, but they argue that the evolving system of water rights on the
western frontier has succeeded in internalizing many of the problems
associated with externalities. 3 They argue that much of the government
regulation stemming from the reclamation projects in the twentieth century
resulted from rent-seeking behavior rather than an attempt to protect public
interests. 4
Along with debating the desirable characteristics of water markets,
many researchers describe the evolution of water allocation laws and
organizations over time! There seems to be consensus that the institutions
necessary to support water markets will evolve in response to greater water
scarcity.76 Indeed, there are examples of what North calls "adaptive
efficiency" in which water allocation laws and organizations have evolved
to promote more efficient water use.n Most change has occurred gradually,
but rapid change such as the development of the 1991 California Emergency
Drought Water Bank is also possible.' However, while examples of
68. Id. at 475.
69. Id.
70. For another study advocating water markets combined with a set of strict regulations
to protect third parties, see generally BRENT V HADDAD, RVER* OFGOU DESIGNING MARKT
To ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA (2000).
71. See generally TERRY L ANDERSON & PAMELA SN DER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISmILE PUM (1997).
72. Id. at 50-52.
73. Id. at 31.44.
74. Id. at 47-50. For a viewpoint in opposition to Anderson and Snyder's free-market
approach, see Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect
Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 489 (1989). Brajer et al.
are pessimistic about the prospects of allocating water through market mechanisms and
advocate greater restrictions.
75. See generally ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 71; Shupe et al., supra note 11; Johnson
& DuMars, supra note 1.
76. See generally ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 71; Shupe et al., supra note 11; Johnson
& DuMars, supra note 1.
77. NoRm, supra note 35, at 80.
78. Howitt, supra note 11, at 371.
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adaptive efficiency exist, institutional change resulting from rent-seeking
behavior does not necessarily promote more efficient water use.79
Furthermore, as this article demonstrates, some institutions are relatively
impervious to change. Thus, markets may evolve more quickly in one area
than another, even when water is scarce in each region. In order to
understand how and when water market institutions evolve, we need to
have a greater understanding of the path-dependent nature of institutional
change.
B. Comparison of CVP and C-BT Water Allocation Institutions
This study focuses on four key institutional features that impact the
cost of water market transactions in the CVP and the C-BT. They are (1) the
contracts between water districts and the Bureau of Reclamation (the
Bureau), (2) the water rationing mechanisms, (3) the return-flow rules, and
(4) the presence or absence of acreage limitations. These institutional
restrictions and their impact on the development of water markets in the
CVP and the C-BT are analyzed in the following section.
1. Water Districts and Reclamation Contracts
The Bureau contracts with over 250 entities in the CVP. The
contractors include water districts, individuals, and municipalities." Some
of the water districts were established long before the CVP was built, with
the initial purpose of building and operating local water irrigation projects.
Others were established much later with the explicit purpose of contracting
with the Bureau for CVP deliveries. The water district entitlements range
from a few acre-feet to over a million acre-feet per year.'2 In addition to
contracting with water districts, the Bureau contracts directly with riparian
landowners that held prior claims to the water diverted by the Bureau.'
The contracts between water users and the water districts in the
CVP entitled farmers to use a set amount of water on a given piece of land."
The contracts did not provide individual farmers with the explicit right to
79. ANDERSON & SNYDw, supra note 71, at 47-50.
80. AR L LrnUwoRm & Exic L GARN, CAi-ORNIA WAER 5 (1995).
81. U.S.B uREAuOpREcLATIONMID-PACnRCREGiON, WATERSERviCEREPORTI-12 (Mar.
8,2001).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 5-10.
84. The contracts are known as "water service contracts." Water users pay a combined
capital and operation and maintenance charge on each acre-foot of water delivered. Capital
repayment was amortized over a 40-year repayment period on an interest-free basis. Some
capital costs were to be paid by hydropower sales and bymunicipal and industrial water users.
WAHL, supra note 51, at 52. For more information on the water service contracts, see the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939,43 U.S.C. § 485-48k (1994),
Spring 20011
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
transfer their entitlement to another farmer or even to change the nature of
water use on their own land without approval.' The Central Valley Project
Improvement Act lifted many of the restrictions on water transfers, but
trades between water districts require approval by the Bureau and/or the
State Water Resources Control Board." The rules that regulate transfers
depend on whether the parties to a transaction have riparian, pre-1914
appropriative rights, post-1914 appropriative rights, or more junior contract
rights." Transfers are not approved if they will have a significant long-term
adverse impact on groundwater conditions within the basin of origin, or if
they will unreasonably impact the water supply, operations, or financial
conditions of the supplying district."
In contrast to the CVP, the NCWCD is the only water district in the
C-BT. It was established in 1937 to be responsible for guaranteeing the
repayment of project costs, negotiating solutions to conflicts with the basin
of origin, and allocating water among users with various needs&" The
NCWCD serves agricultural (both individuals and mutual ditch
companies), municipal, and industrial users, and is responsible for
achieving compromises between these diverse groups.' The delegation of
power to a single water district provides the C-BT with a more coherent
governance structure than the CVP.91
In both Colorado and California, transfers between water districts
require a lengthy approval process. The cost of trading within the C-BT is
lower than in the CVP because one district governs all C-BT water
allocations. Since the NCWCD includes both agricultural and urban users,
trades between these groups are possible at relatively low cost. In contrast,
most of the CVP contractors are agricultural users, so transfers to urban
sectors typically extend beyond the project's boundaries and involve
additional regulatory complexity.
85. WAHL, supra note 51.
86. U.S. Bureauof Reclamation, Mid-PacificRegion, Central ValleyProject Improvement Act
Final Administrative Proposal on Water Transfersathttp://www.mp.usbr.gov/cvpia/trwt.html
(Apr. 17, 1998). See 8eneralhy Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L 102-575, Title
XxxIV, 106 Stat. 4604 (1992).
87. U.S. Bureau of Reclamiation, Mid-Pacific Region, Central Valley Project Improvement Act
Final Administrative Proposal on Water Transfrrs, at http://www.mp.usbr.gov/cvpia/ltrwt.html
(Apr. 17,1998).
88. Id.
89. DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE iN Tm Wilsr THmE COLORADO-BIG THOMPSON
PROJECT AND nh NOR1hERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 61 (1992). The
NCWCD was created as part of the Water Conservancy District Act, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws ch.
266.
90. Michelsen, supra note 3, at 974.
91. Howe et aL, Lessons, supra note 3, at 195-96.
[Vol. 41
EMERGING MARKETS IN WATER
Even if the rules (both statutes and internal district rules) governing
transfers were modified to make it easier to obtain approval for trades
between districts in the CVP, some trades are restricted by physical factors.
Necessary canals may not exist or it may be costly to obtain the rights to
distribute the water. If a transfer requires use of distribution networks in
multiple districts, permission must be obtained from each. The absence of
water metering devices can also limit trades. Some of the districts in the
CVP meter individual water use by the acre-foot, while other districts (those
with more plentiful supplies) charge their water users a fixed per-acre rate
because they do not have metering devices to monitor individual use.' The
measurement and enforcement costs of trading are high when districts do
not meter individual water on a per-acre-foot basis. In addition to capacity,
coordination, and metering constraints, districts may have water quality
concerns if a proposed trade involves pumping lower-quality water into the
distribution system.'3
2. Water Rationing Mechanisms
a. Priority Rationing in the CVP
If the supply of water were constant each year, surface water rights
would be relatively easy to define. However, water supplies depend on
stochastic weather conditions. Therefore, a non-market water allocation
system that does not rely on prices to equate demand with supply must
develop a rationing mechanism. Water in the CVP is rationed according to
a priority system. In the event of a drought, senior-rights holders receive
their full allocation before junior-rights holders receive any of their
allocation. Land associated with senior rights is said to have "higher
priority." Landowners who held riparian rights before the CVP was built,
who entered into "exchange contracts" to substitute their original supplies
for CVP water, have the most senior rights." Next in line are the irrigation
districts that formed in the wake of the 1887 Irrigation District Law and that
92. The rate per-acre depends on the average water requirements of the crop grown
Suppose, for example, that the Bureau wants to generate $10 per acre on average, and suppose
a farm grows 100 acres of cotton. If cotton production in the district requires 4 acre-feet of
applied water per acre on average, the Bureau will charge the farm $40 per acre on 100 acres
or a total of $4000. The farm will pay $40 per acre regardless of the actual amount of water it
uses, as long as the farm's use is not flagrantly wasteful. Interviews with District Staff at Glen-
Colusa water District, Provident Water District, and Richvale Water District (1995).
93. CaL Dep't of Water Res., San Joaquin District Drainage Monitoring Program, at
http://wwwdpla.water.ca.gov/sjd/waterquality/drainage/index.html (last modified Oct. 28,
1998).
94. CLAIR ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT DOCUMENTS PART TWo: OPERATING




contracted early with the Bureau for CVP water. Junior rights belong to
districts that contracted with the Bureau later.
In addition to varying between water districts, user priorities may
also vary within CVP districts. For example, Westlands Water District has
junior water rights relative to other districts in the CVP, but within
Westlands there are also different priority areas, ranked 1, 11, and III." In the
event that full deliveries cannot be met (which has been the norm rather
than the exception in recent years), water is rationed first to Area I land and
then to Area lI landY' Land in Area M only receives water in the event that
the needs of both Areas I and I1 have been met."
The priority rationing system increases the transaction costs
associated with trading by creating heterogeneous rights that must be
quantified and priced for each individual trade. First, the price paid to the
Bureau for an acre-foot of water depends on the seniority of the water right.
In the Westlands case, users in Area I pay less per acre foot for the same
type of water than users in Area II." Second, the likelihood of receiving a
full delivery is greater the more senior the water right. Third, the seniority
of the right technically is attached to the land where it is used."° Thus, if a
right is traded to a user with land in a lower priority area, the seniority of
the right may change as a result of the trade. Since markets in permanent
water rights do not currently exist in the CVP, it is unclear how this issue
would be resolved. If the Bureau has to resolve the issue of relative seniority
on a case-by-case basis, the costs of trading will remain high.
The higher are the transaction costs, the less is the ability of water
users to adapt to short-run supply variations. In the event of shortages,
senior rights holders in the CVP may still receive their full entitlements
while junior rights holders may not receive any water. Thus, senior rights
holders are somewhat insulated from supply shortages and, if they cannot
96. Priority area I encompasses 337,000 acres of land that were part of the original
Westlands Water District. Under a 1963 contract with the Bureau, this area is entitled to 900,000
acre-feet of water in full-delivery water years or 2.6 acre-feet per acre. Area H covers 187,000
acres of land that was annexed by Westlands at a later date from the former Westplains Water
District. This area is entitled to 250,000 acre-feet or 1.3 acre-feet per acre. Area MI covers an
additional 10,000 acres, which was annexed to Westlands after the merger withWestplains. See
CVP Contract Supplies, at http://www.westlandswater.org/Wtr%2OSupply/wsS.htm (last
visited May 10, 2001).
97. Westlands Water District, Terms and Conditions for Agricultural Water Service,
Article 17: Regulations for the Allocation of Agricultural Water within the Westlands Water
District 1-6 (Nov. 16,1992) (unpublished document, on file with author).
98. Id. at 3.
99. See Current Water Rates, at http://www.westlandswater.org/Wtr%2OSupply/
Rates.htm (last visited May 10, 2001).
100. Westlands Water District, supra note 97, at 10.
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easily sell their water to junior rights holders, have little incentive to cut
back their use.
To the extent that senior rights correspond to high-valued uses for
which security of supply is crucial and junior rights correspond to low-
valued uses for which security is not crucial, the priority system may be an
efficient method of allocating scarce supplies. However, such a relationship
does not necessarily exist. For example, Westlands Water District is a low
priority water district, but it is a high productivity district."' Further, within
Westlands, much of the highest productivity land is located in Area II, not
in Area I (the area with the highest priority).
In the intra-seasonal spot market, there is no uncertainty regarding
supply availability at the time a trade is made. The Bureau announces its
deliveries at the beginning of the water year so that all users know how
much water they have in their annual accounts. A water district will only
approve a rental transaction after it has confirmed that the seller actually
has the water in his account. Thus, a buyer should be indifferent between
water contract types (i.e., the water seniority), and the market price should
be independent of the contract type. However, the seniority of the water
right will affect the transfer price, which is the price paid by the buyer to the
seller. The market price equals the Bureau water rate plus the proceeds to
the seller. Since the Bureau water rate is in general lower the more senior
the right, the proceeds to the seller will be higher the more senior the right.
Therefore, the price paid by the buyer to the seller is specific to the contract
type and the location of the trade. If a trade in permanent water rights were
to occur, the buyer and the seller would have to consider the added
complexity of supply uncertainty when valuing the right. 2
b. Proportional Rationing in the C-BT
In the C-BT, water is rationed according to a proportional system."°3
The C-BT is designed to deliver a maximum of 310,000 acre-feet per year.1°1
The NCWCD divided the water into 310,000 individual allotments that are
transferable contracts between the district and the holder, subject to the
holder's ability to show beneficial use of the water within the boundaries
101. David Zilberman et al., Water for California Agriculture Lessons from the Drought and
New Water Market Reform., CHOICES, Fourth Quarter 1994, at 25,26.
102. The value of 100 acre-feet of water depends on the seniority of the right and the user's
expectations about future supply. Clearly 100 acre-feet of senior-rightwater is worth more than
100 acre-feet of junior-right water, because in a given year the expected supply is greater for
the senior-right water. In a drought, the owner of the senior right may still receive full supply
while the owner of the junior right may receive nothing at all




of the district. 05 If the C-BT delivers less than the full 310,000 acre-feet in a
given year, supplies to all users are cutback proportionally.' In April each
year the NCWCD board of directors determines the annual quota based on
hydrologic conditions and anticipated water demand.1"The purpose of the
C-BT is to supply supplemental water that, when combined with a water
user's primary supply, will reduce the variability of supplies across years.
Therefore, in wet years the board of directors sets a lower quota in order to
store water for use during dry years.' This pattem of allocation contrasts
sharply with the pattern in the CVP, where supplies increase in wet years
and decrease in dry years.
There are four categories of allotment contracts between the
NCWCD and the water users, depending on whether the contractor is an
individual (Class D), a municipality (Class B), a ditch company (Class C),
or a corporation (Section 25).1"9 Water users can rent and transfer water
from one location of use or class of service to another, and they can buy and
sell permanent allotment contracts that are severed from the land. The C-
BT's proportional rationing system lends itself more easily to the creation
of a water market because the property rights are relatively homogenous.
A user's expected supply in a given year depends only on the number of
allotments he owns or rents. It does not matter from whom the user buys
or rents an allotment or where the water is used as long as it is within the
NCWCD boundaries.
3. Acreage Limitations
Another factor that adds complexity to the CVP governance
structure is the farm acreage limitation stipulated by the Reclamation Act
of 1902.110 The C-BT is not subject to the acreage limitations of the Act.
According to the Act,
No right to the use of water for land in private ownership
shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres
to any one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any
landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such
land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said
105. J.M. DILE, A BRIE HISTORY OF THE NORTmRN COLORADO WATERCONSERVANCY
Disermcr AND THE CoLORADO-BIG THOMPSON PROJECr 28 (1958).
106. For example, if the aggregate supply is reduced by 10 percent to 279,000 acre-feet, then
each individual's supply will be reduced by 10 percent. Ifa user owns 100 allotments and thus
receives 100 acre-feet in a full-delivery year, he or she will receive 90 acre-feet
107. TYLER, supra note 89, at 269.
108. Id. at 269-270.
109. DILLE, supra note 105, at 28.
110. Pub. L No. 57-161,32 Stat. 388.
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land, and no such right shall permanently attach until all
payments thereof are made."'
The acreage limitation was intended to promote small-scale family
farming, but the law failed to achieve this goal. First, 160-acre farms that
may have been viable in the eastern part of the country were not profitable
in the semi-arid West. Second, by the time the CVP was constructed, the
majority of the land to be served by the project was already in private
holdings larger than 160 acres."'
Abuse of the acreage requirement ranged from allowing a husband
and wife each to hold 160 acres, and thus increasing a farm's size to 320
acres, to out and out violations."3 In 1982, the Bureau increased the
allowable acreage to 960 acres and, in exchange for relaxing the acreage
limitation, vowed to enforce the rule."4 However, large farms were able to
satisfy technical compliance with the law by distributing 960-acre plots to
individual family members and creating family trusts or "farm
management units." '5
Even though the federal government has never strictly enforced the
acreage limitation law, the law has deterred transfers in the CVP in two
ways. First, the law is yet another factor that increases the heterogeneity of
water rights because the value of a given right is a function of the size of the
farm on which the water is used. The 1982 amendment" 6 allows farms to
receive project water on land in excess of 960 acres but the farm must pay
a higher rate (so called "full-cost") for the water to the excess land."' Thus,
the acreage limitation, along with the seniority system, forces the buyer and
the seller to consider the location of water use in addition to the quantity
being transferred.
Second, the law has contributed to the perception among farmers
that their rights are insecure. From the CVP's early days to the present,
abuse of the acreage limitation has been a focal point of critics of the CVP
and other Bureau projects."' The stated intent of the reclamation projects
was to provide new opportunities for family farming in the West,"' but,
111. 32Stat.at389.
112. In 1935, the average farm size was just over 200 acres, but 70 percent of the land was
in farms of a thousand acres or more. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREATTHIrsT 237-38 (1992).
113. Id. at 265-66.
114. Id. at 380-81. See generally WAHL, supra note 51, at 69-126.
115. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 382-83.
116. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-293, Tit. 11, 96 Stat. 1261,1263-1274.
117. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 381.
118. See generall. DONALD WORSTER, RVVERS OF E iM (1985); MARC REISNER, CADU.LAC
DESERT (1986).
119. See Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L No. 57-161,32 Stat. 388,390; 35 CONG. REC. 6758
(1902); S. Doc. No. 57-446, at 2,21 (1902).
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instead, critics point out, the projects have provided subsidized water to
large corporate farms at taxpayer expense." In the same way that farm
lobbies have been able to use political might to ward off enforcement of the
law until now, farm lobbies realize that urban and environmental interest
groups may be able to wield their increasing power to force changes that
jeopardize their water rights. Given this political uncertainty, farmers may
be hesitant to participate in water market transactions. Even though the
"use it or lose it" rule has been amended to allow farms to sell conserved
water, by selling their water,' even on a short-term basis, they will be
demonstrating that the water is not essential to them, and this could be used
against them in the future. Further, in a well-organized market, prices will
be publicly available, and the extent of the federal subsidy farmers receive
through low water rates will become more obvious to the general public."n
4. Return Flow Rules
Colorado state law protects downstream parties from the adverse
impacts of changes in upstream water use patterns by placing liability for
damages on upstream users."u Despite the traditional treatment of return
flows in Colorado state law, C-BT water is not subject to the same return
flow rule. Rather than again becoming part of the stream as called for under
Colorado appropriative law, C-BT return flows were declared to be owned
by the controlling water district. 4
The decision by the authors of the Repayment Contract to grant
ownership of return flows to the water district, instead of to downstream
users, proved tobe instrumental in reducing the transaction costs associated
120. See generally WoasimT supra note 118; RESN, supra note 118; WAHL, supra note 51,
at 27-46.
121. The California Water Code states, "[tlhe sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or
water rights, in itself, shall not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use..." CAL.
WA ERCODE § 1244 (West Supp. 2001). See generally Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water
in California, 1 W.-NORTHWES J. ENVTL L 49 (1994); Brian E. Gray et al., Transfers of Federal
Reclamation Water: A Case Study of California's San Joaquin Valley, 21 ENV L L 911 (1991).
122. Many districts in the CVP recently had to renegotiate their contracts with the Bureau
because their 40-year contracts were expiring. These districts had additional incentive to
demonstrate a need for all of their water. To the dismay of many environmentalists and urban
groups, all of the districts successfully renegotiated their contracts. Their rates were increased,
but supply levels were maintained. Other districts still face the uncertainty of contract renewal.
Westands Water District's contract expires in 2007.
123. See, e.g., Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d
552 (Colo. 1947); Fort Collins Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 156 P.
140 (Colo. 1914); Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107 (Colo. 1913).
124. Article 19 of the Repayment Contract with the United States Bureau of Reclamation.
For a discussion of Colorado state law dealing with "foreign water," see GEORGE VRANESH,
VR sH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 122-25 (James N. Corbrldge & Teresa A. Rice eds., Rev. ed.
1999).
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with C-BT water trades.'s Simple buyer-seller market transactions of C-BT
water can take place without having to determine the amount of
consumptive use or return flow." Return-flow interdependencies can be
ignored because downstream parties have no legal grounds for objection.
The return-flow provision frees C-BT water from many of the legal
obstacles that stifle transfers in the CVP; however, by ignoring the impacts
on third parties, economically inefficient transfers may be allowed to take
place. 1
In the CVP, water users must be much more cognizant of
hydrologic connections when contemplating water transfers or other
changes in on-farm water application. Several sections of the California
State Water Code, taken together, form what is commonly termed the "no
injury rule."" This rule prohibits water right changes that "operate to the
injury of any legal user of the water involved."" An implication of the no
injury rule is that if a transfer of water would affect the availability of water
for downstream users then the proposed transfer would not be allowed,
regardless of the water right priority of those users.'" Similar rules apply
to groundwater impacts of surface water transfers. 3 To date, the California
Legislature has avoided developing statutes that rigorously define the
rights and obligations associated with groundwater use. In the absence of
such a body of law, the notion that groundwater belongs primarily to the
overlying landowner has emerged, including percolated imported surface
water."
The protections afforded downstream water users in California also
frustrate many potential trades. The no injury rule protects the return flows
received by all types of downstream users. The basic implication of this
rule is that adjacent and downstream landowners effectively have veto
power over proposed trades and other changes in water application. While
it is theoretically possible that potential transferors may compensate those
125. Howe et al., Lessons, supra note 3, at 185-86.
126. ld. at 186.
127. Howe et al, The Potentialfor Water Markets, supra note 3, at 441.
128. See CAL WATER CODE §§ 1702,1706 (West 1971).
129. § 1702 (emphasis added).
130. The no injury rule leads to some contradictions. For example, a user may capture
historic return flows from agricultural practices and apply it to land within the originally
permitted place of use. However, if the same user wanted to apply this saved water to a new
place of use (perhaps through a transfer), then it would not be permissible. In either case,
downstream interests are harmed, but the transfer would be prohibited.
131. §§ 1702, 1706.
132. See, e.g., Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 1 (CL
App. 1964).
133. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CoNTRoL BD, CAL ENVrL, PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDE 1 WATER
TRANSFERS 3-7 to 3-9 (1999).
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who would suffer from a transfer, this outcome is unlikely due to the
complexities of surface and groundwater flow, the lack of adequate
information about the magnitude and timing of these third party impacts,
and the large numbers of landowners involved. Alternatively, the transferor
may only attempt to sell consumptive use and leave return flows
unaffected. While this option is more appealing from a legal standpoint, it
makes many transfers uneconomic given average farm-level irrigation
efficiencies of 70 percent."
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS
The histories of the CVP and the C-BT were similar in many
respects."3 For example, they were both built by the Bureau of Reclamation
at roughly the same time. Construction on the CVP began in 1937,"36 while
construction on the C-BT began in 1938.1 Delivery of CVP water to the San
Joaquin Valley commenced in 195 1,m while the first C-BT water flowed
through the Continental Divide in 194 7."r The stated intention of each
project was to provide supplementary water supplies to land already
settled." In the case of California, water was transported from the northern
third of the state to the southern two-thirds of the state. In Colorado, water
was transported from the western slope to the eastern slope of the Rocky
Mountains. The projects required sophisticated technology for the day. In
both states, engineers devised pumps to transport water uphill, and in
134. See CAL. DEP'TOF WATER RES., BuLunN 160-98, at 4-21 (1998).
135. The federal Central Valley Project was first authorized by the Rivers and Harbors Act
of Aug. 30, 1935, Pub. L No. 73-409, 49 Stat. 1028, 1038. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes
presented a finding of feasibility to President Roosevelt on November 26,1935. The CVP was
re-authorized for constrtiction by the Department of Interior and made subject to the
reclamation laws by the Rivers and Harbors Act of Aug. 26,1937. The congressional logjam
over the Colorado-Big Thompson was broken when Congress passed S. Doc. No. 75-80 (1937),
a plan of development and cost estimate. On August 9,1937, Congress appropriated an initial
$900,000 for the CBT in accordance with S. DOC. No. 75-80 (1937). In November of 1937,
Secretary Ickes presented a finding of feasibility to President Roosevelt and the President
approved it on December 21,1937.
136. See ROBERT AUTOREE ET AL, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT: HISTORIC RECLAMATION
PROJECis Boox 7 (1996).
137. See DILE, supra note 105, at 29.
138. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 274.
139. TYLER, supra note 89, at 156-57. Constructionof the C-BTwas completed in 1956. Dz
supra note 105, at 61.
140. Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1938, Hearings before Subcomm. of Comm. on
Appropriations, 75th Cong. 1594 (1938); BUREAU OF RE CLAMATON, DE"T OF THE INERIOR,
SYNOPSES OF REPORT ON COLORADO-BIG THOMPSON PROJECT, PLAN OF DEV oMWTr AND COST
ESTIMATE, S. DOC. No. 75-80, at 6-10 (1937).
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Colorado, engineers blasted a water tunnel through a section of the
mountains.4'
Despite these common features, markedly different water allocation
institutions were adopted for each project. The decision makers at the state
and federal levels sought governance structures that would enable them to
allocate the initial water supplies at the lowest cost. They required contracts
that would provide the water users with secure rights and provide the
federal government with a means to recover its construction investments 14
The decision makers were much less concerned with the long-run ability of
the projects to adapt to shifts in the demand for water.
The analysis that follows focuses on the origins of the four water
allocation institutions discussed above-the water district structure, the
acreage limitation rule, the system of rationing, and the return flow rule.
Pre-existing water laws, and the vested interests that grew up around those
laws, shaped the choice of institutions in the CVP and C-BT. The feasible set
of water allocation institutions also was constrained by the earlier
challenges of obtaining political support for the projects and federal
funding for construction. Thus, a review of pre-existing water laws and an
examination of the struggles to obtain political and financial support for the
projects precede the analysis of the four water allocation institutions.
A. Pre-Existing Institutions
The complex and often contradictory nature of California's pre-
existing state water rights laws complicated the task of developing the
institutions to allocate CVP water. California law accommodates riparian
and prior appropriation doctrines (as well as correlative pueblo and Indian
rights).
The riparian doctrine, which preceded the prior appropriation
doctrine, is the most common form used in the eastern United States. Under
riparian law, landowners located along a river or stream can use as much
water as they need to irrigate their fields, but they cannot divert water for
use on lands outside the original watershed. When the riparian doctrine is
strictly enforced, water rights may not be transferred to others for use on
non-adjacent lands. Thus, landowners without riverfront acreage are
excluded from surface water use. In areas where water supplies are
141. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 274; TYZ supra note 89, at 131-40.
142. Article 19 of the Repayment Contract with the United States Bureau of Reclamnation,
reprinted in, DILLE, supra note 105, at 27. A satisfactory Repayment Contract was required as
part of Amendment 90 of the Interior Department Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1938.
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abundant relative to demand, and thus there are fewer conflicts in use,
riparian laws apply and usually are not enforced very rigorously.'
The prior appropriation doctrine is more common in the western
United States, where competition for scarce water resources is greater. In
contrast to riparian law, which is based on land ownership, appropriative
law is fundamentally a usufructuary right. The appropriative right defines
the time and place of water diversion, the place where the water is to be
used, and the type of use. If the appropriator wishes to change any
dimension of the right, he must apply for a permit change with the state.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, senior rights are granted to the first
person or party to put water to "beneficial use" regardless of whether the
land on which the water is used is contiguous to a stream. This is expressed
as "first in time, first in right." The definition of beneficial use varies from
state to state; however, traditional beneficial uses have included irrigation,
livestock watering, industrial, and domestic uses. Only recently have state
legislatures included recreational uses and fish and wildlife habitat
protection in the definition of beneficial use.'"
Once an appropriative right is established it continues to exist as
long as the water is beneficially used. A right may be declared abandoned
if the appropriator intentionally discontinues use for several years. Even if
the appropriator unintentionally discontinues use for a period of time
established by statute, the right may be forfeited. This is commonly called
the "use it or lose it" rule.145
An extremely important aspect of prior appropriation doctrine is
its treatment of return flows. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, return
flows again become part of the stream and are subject to downstream
appropriation. State laws attempt to protect downstream parties from the
adverse impacts of changes in upstream water use patterns, including
transfers among users, by requiring that upstream users advertise any
proposed changes in points of diversion or types of use. Downstream
parties who expect to be damaged by such changes are then permitted to
petition the water court for relief. This judicial process is costly and time-
consuming and can lead to inefficiency in the transfer process to the extent
that it prevents desirable transfers. There may be more efficient ways to
address third-party hazards.'
California's dual rights system is largely a legacy of the landmark
case of Lux v. Haggin,"'4 which pitted riparian rights holder Henry Miller
143. See generally Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASnNGSLJ. 249
(1994).
144. See generally id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
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(Lux was Miller's partner) against prior appropriation rights holder James
Haggin for control of the Kern River. After five years of litigation in the
lower courts, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of Miller and
reaffirmed the right of a riparian on private land to demand undiminished
flow of a water source. The supremacy of riparian rights over prior
appropriation rights was strengthened in the case of Herminghaus v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., u in which the California Supreme Court ruled that a
downstream riparian can command the entire flow of a river to flood-
irrigate land. The decision upheld a riparian's right to usurp the claims of
an appropriator and use water in an unreasonable and wasteful manner. In
response to public outcry over Herntinghaus, the California Constitution was
amended in 1928 to require all water uses, not just prior appropriation uses,
to be both reasonable and beneficial. These cases, combined with others
pertaining to groundwater rights, pueblo rights, and federal reservation
rights, led to the system that has come to be known as the "California
Doctrine." The use of this dual system further complicated the already
difficult task of establishing well-defined property rights for water. 49
Unlike California, Colorado does not recognize riparian rights. This
simplified the task of negotiating with pre-existing rights holders when the
C-BT was built.
The laws pertaining to water districts also differed between the two
states. In California, the 1887 Irrigation District Law (known as the Wright
Act)15s permitted the formation of irrigation districts. The Act declared that
the use of water for irrigation provided a public benefit and thus deserved
public funding.' The irrigation districts were granted quasi-municipality
status, which meant they had the power to levy taxes in order to build
public projects."s2 By 1930 there were nearly 90 irrigation districts in
California, covering 1.6 million acres.'
An equivalent law to the Wright Act did not exist in Colorado.
Water users in Colorado organized mutual ditch companies, which are
owner-operated and financed irrigation companies that distribute water
according to the ownership of shares in the company." Ownership of the
water rights and the water facilities of the company are held in common by
148. 252 P. 607 (CaL 1926).
149. HUNDJEY, supra note 112, at 240-41.
150. 1887 Cal. Stats., ch. 34.
151. Id. at 108-09.
152. In reaction to the Lux v. Haggin ruling, prior appropriation rights holders formed an
anti-riparian league and, in order to remedy their disadvantage against riparian farmers,
lobbied for the right to use public funding to fund irrigation projects. HUNDLEY, supra note 112,
at 97-98.
153. Id. at 237.
154. VRANESHi, supra note 124, at 282-95.
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the shareholders.1" Colorado also enacted legislation that allowed for the
formation of irrigation districts, but the water districts did not have the
power to levy taxes." The irrigation districts' main source of revenue for
the construction of water projects was through the issuance of bonds."
In the hope of securing funds from the Work Projects
Administration (WPA) to build irrigation projects, the Colorado Legislature
passed the Water Conservation District Law in 1935. The Law granted a
group of irrigators the right to act as a public body and to contract with the
WPA. The Law empowered districts to borrow money, pledge revenues as
security, accept bids for construction contracts, and collect rents for water
service. However, it did not grant them the power to "levy or collect taxes
for the purpose of paying, in whole or in part, any indebtedness or
obligation.. .incurred by the district."" As will be discussed below, this
omission proved to be crucial in determining the governance structure of
the C-BT.
B. The CVP's Origins: The State Water Plan
The CVP began as a state project. In 1919 Robert Marshall
published an ambitious plan that would have delivered water supplies to
the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles, as well as to the Central
Valley. Writing about the potential for irrigation in California, Marshall
said,
There are approximately 12,000,000 acres of level land in the
Sacramento, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, Livermore, and
Concord Valleys, and more than enough water annually
passes through the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers into
the sea unused, lost forever, toJput water three feet deep on
each of these 12,000,000 acres. 160
155. Id.
156. irrigation District Law of 1905, COw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-41-101 to 37-41-160 (West
1990 & Supp. 2000); Irrigation District Law of 1921, Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-42-101 to 37-
42-141 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000).
157. VRANESH, supra note 124, at 298.
158. 1935 Colo. Sees. Laws ch. 145, § 8.
159. At the time, Marshall was the Chief Geographer of the U.S. Geological Survey, but he
acted in a private capacity,
160. Robert Bradford Marshall, Irrigation of Twelve Million Acres in the Valley of
California 7 (Mar. 16,1919) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Bancroft Library, U.C.
Berkeley).
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Marshall's plan failed to gain approval in the state legislature in
1919 and 1921. Three modified versions went on the ballot as initiatives and
were rejected by the voters in 1922, 1924, and 1926.161
The State Engineer, Edward Hyatt, introduced a scaled-back State
Water Plan to the legislature in 1931.'6 In addition to delivering water from
the Sacramento Valley south to the San Joaquin Valley, the plan called for
an aqueduct from the Colorado River to deliver water to southern
California." Southern California had already begun efforts to secure
Colorado River water on its own, however, and believed that involvement
with the state would complicate its efforts. Therefore, it asked not to be
included in the state project.'" With the omission of southern California, the
state project became almost exclusively a Central Valley project with the
goal of supplying water for irrigated agriculture. During the 1930s, it was
hard to justify projects that would bring more land into pioduction. Thus,
the project sponsors promised that the "immediate initial" projectwould
not appreciably increase the area of agricultural lands in California.1"
The Central Valley Project Act was passed in the California State
Legislature in 1933." Pacific Gas & Electric and other private power
interests attempted to block the project, but the voters reaffirmed it in a
referendum election later that year. The Act authorized the state water
authority to issue revenue bonds in a total sum not to exceed $170,000,000
to finance the construction of the CVP.1' While project sponsors intended
for the CVP to be-a state project, the Act authorized the Authority to "accept
cooperation" from the federal government in the construction,
maintenance, and operation of the project."3
Given the bleak state of the economy in 1933, California never
attempted to issue the bonds to finance construction of the project. The idea
of the CVP as a state undertaking backed by federal financial assistance was
surrendered to federal construction of the project. The California
congressional delegation painted a picture of desperation to convince the
161. HuNDLEY, supra note 112, at 239.
162. CAL. DEF'T OF PUB. WORKs, Div. OF WATER RES., BuuzN No. 25, REPoRTTO
LEGISLATRE OF 1931 ON STATE WATER PLAN 33.57 (1930). Hyatt's plan was referred to as the
"State Water Plan," but it should not be confused with the State Water Project that was built
in the 1960s.
163. Id.
164. HuNDLEY, supra note 112, at 243.
165. Id.
166. See generally MARYM ONTWGOMERY&MAIUONCLAWSONHTORYOFLEGLSLATION AND
POLICY FORMATION OF= 7E CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT (1946).
167. HUNDLEy, supra note 112, at 248.
168. Id.
169. MONIwOMERY &CLAwSON, supra note 166, at 81.
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federal government to take over the project."' It claimed the CVP would
provide supplemental water to farmers, who after making large
investments in equipment and land improvements, were being driven from
their farms due to a decline in groundwater that they could not have
foreseen.,71 If the federal government did not provide help, they warned
that San Joaquin Valley farmers would be added to the long list of
Americans already on the unemployment rolls.17 In testimony to Congress,
State Engineer Hyatt argued that the CVP was not a new-lands project but
rather a relief project targeted at areas already under agricultural
production in the Central Valley. Without the project he claimed that 50,000
Califormias would lose their livelihoods and be forced off the land.73
President Roosevelt authorized initial funding of $20 million for the
CVP through the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935.174 The CVP
was not authorized as a federal reclamation project, but the Act clearly
stated that the money was to be reimbursable under the Reclamation Act of
1902." The terms of reimbursement under the Reclamation Act included
an interest-free loan, a forty-year repayment period, and compliance with
the excess lands provision limiting farm size to 160 acres. 176 Because the
initial funding for the CVP came through an executive order,77 the details
of the project were not subject to lengthy congressional debate. The CVP's
promoters emphasized the benefits and feasibility of the project and
downplayed the costs." The federal government accepted the state's cost
estimate of $170 million and adopted the state's engineering plans.1"
Congress reauthorized the project in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937,"
again stating that the CVP would be subject to the repayment guidelines of
the Reclamation Act."' According to the Act, the CVP's top priorities were
improvements of flood control and navigation, and saltwater abatement in
170. HuNDEY, supra note 112, at 251-52.
171. Id.
172. Lawrence B. Lee, California Water Politics: Depression Genesis ofthe Central Valley Project,
1933-1944, J. OF THE WEST, Oct. 1985, at 63,65-66.
173. Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1938, Hearings before Subcomm. of Comm. on
Appropriations, 75th Cong. 1590-98 (1938).
174. The amount was later reduced to $4.2 million. The letter from President Roosevelt is
reprinted in CLAiR ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY PRojEcr DocUMENI PART ONE: AUT-ORIING
DOCUMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 84-416, at 559 (1956).
175. Id. at 559.
176. Id. at 569-71. The statutory requirement for acreage limitation and the repayment
terms are contained in 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994).
177. MONTOMERY & CLAWSON, supra note 166, at 81.
178. Id. at 75-76.
179. Letter from Secretary Harold L Ickes to President Franklin Roosevelt (Nov. 29,1935),
reprinted in MONTGoimiRy & CLAWSON, supra note 166, at 249 app.D.
180. Pub. L. No. 75-392,50 Stat. 844,850(1937).
181. Id.
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the delta.82 The goal of supplying water for irrigation and domestic use was
next in importance, and power generation was last."
C. The C-Brs Origins: The Grand Lake Plan
Unlike the CVP, the C-BT did not begin as a state project. The idea
for a trans-mountain diversion project to transfer water from the
headwaters of the Colorado River to the eastern slope of the Rockies dates
back to the 1880s. The original project was known as the Grand Lake Plan."8
However, while the idea originated at the state level, Colorado water
managers realized from an early stage that a trans-mountain diversion
would require federal aid.' 8' Furthermore, Coloradans felt that they
deserved a piece of the federal reclamation pie. Other states were using
federal money to appropriate water from rivers whose headwaters were in
Colorado and which Coloradans felt was rightly theirs.'8
Colorado had been competing with Wyoming and Nebraska for the
rights to the North Platte River and with the lower basin states for the rights
to the Colorado River. In 1933 the WPA decided to fund the Casper-Alcova
Project, which would enable Wyoming to store North Platte water upstream
from Casper and develop 60,000 to 80,000 acres of land for irrigated
agriculture.". Colorado's defeat in the battle for the Platte River rights,
combined with the lingering fight over Colorado River water and four years
of below average rainfall, created a panic among Colorado water
managers.' If Colorado did not act quickly to secure its water supplies,
they believed the other western states would appropriate the flows
necessary for Colorado's future development. They were especially fearful
of California, with its rapidly growing population and strong representation
in Congress.
Northern Colorado water managers established the Northern
Colorado Water Users Association (NCWUA) in 1934 to promote the idea
of a trans-mountain diversion project and convince the federal government
to build it." The Association represented 80 irrigation ditch companies in
seven counties." The project faced strong opposition from landowners on
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The name was changed to the Colorado-Big Thompson Project in July 1936. TYLER,
supra note 89, at 55.
185. Norcross, supra note 14, at 30.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id.




the western slope of the Rocky Mountains (the basin of origin).
Representatives from the western slope, most notably Congressman
Edward Taylor, argued that the project must provide an acre-foot of water
to the western slope for every acre-foot provided to the eastern slope as
well as additional storage capacity for western slope users.191 The National
Park Service also opposed the project because it called for a tunnel to be
built through a section of Rocky Mountain National Park."2 Further, senior
appropriators and successful ditch companies on the eastern slope opposed
the plan because they did not want new acreage to come into production
when agricultural prices were already depressed. ' 93 The project promoters
promised that the C-BT would provide supplemental water for future urban
growth and agricultural land already under production.'"
Colorado's initial application for funding from the Bureau for the
C-BT was denied in 1936." In order to secure federal funding, the NCWUA
needed to overcome opposition to the project and convince Congress that
the C-BT would not pit the western half of the state against the eastern half.
In addition, the NCWUA needed to convince the federal government that
the project was feasible and that northern Colorado was capable of repaying
the federal government for its construction.
D. Origins of the Water District Structure
The somewhat ad hoc system of contracting in the CVP is a function
of the battle between the state and federal governments for control of the
project and the relative lack of attention paid to the project's repayment.
The Bureau did not submit repayment contracts for signature in the years
immediately following its takeover of the CVP. It required contracts with
the water users before water would be delivered, but not before
construction could begin.'" During the early construction period, it was not
clear if the water users would contract with the California Water Project
Authority or with the Bureau.
When the federal government took over the CVP in 1935, California
possessed an information advantage. It had already invested close to a
million dollars in surveys, engineering studies, and data collection for
191. Colorado Irrigation Men Bury Ax to Get U.S. Cash, ROCKY MOUNTMN NEWS, Sept 28,
1933; Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 1938, Appendix at 83.
192. TYLER, supra note 89, at 48-49.
193. Id. at 54.
194. See generally J.M. M, COLORADo-BIG ThOiMSON AND NORTHERNCOLORADO
COSERVANcy D sRcT (1941).
195. TYLER, supra note 89, at 55-57.
196. Lee, supra note 172, at 68.
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construction of the project.' It had also conducted preliminary negotiations
for rights-of-way and water contracts with farmers in the Valley.'"
Consequently, the federal government had an incentive to form a
cooperative relationship with the state. In the proposed governance
structure, the Water Project Authority (the Authority) was to play a joint
role with the Bureau in negotiating water contracts and administering the
project.'" The cooperative nature of the relationship is illustrated in the
House appropriations bills from 1937 through 1940. Each year the bill read
as follows:
The Water Project Authority of the State of California, created
by an act of the legislature, is cooperating with the Bureau of
Reclamation in the construction of the Central Valley Project.
Under the terms of a contract dated March 25, 1936, the
Authority will negotiate contracts, subject to approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, for necessary rights-of-way and
acquisition of water rights. Contracts for repayment of
construction costs will be made under the Reclamation law
either with the Authority or with the several irrigation
districts before water is supplied for irrigation. A part of the
construction costs will be repaid from the sale of surplus
electrical energy developed at the Sacramento power
plants.
In 1939 the governor of California, Culbert Olson, tried to initiate
legislation to enable the Authority to play a more direct role in the
administration of the project. In a letter to the Secretary of the Interior,
Harold Ickes, Olson proposed that the Authority enter into a contract with
the United States under which the Authority would operate and maintain
the project upon completion, repay the reimbursable costs of the project to
the United States by revenues from the sale of water and electric power, and
direct and assist in the organization of public districts to contract with the
197. MONTWoMERy& CLAWSON, supra note 166, at 146-64.
198. Id.
199. CLAIR ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECr DoCumEWI3 PART ONE:AUTHORIZING
DOcumiims, H.R. DoC. No. 84416, at 433 (1956).
200. Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1937: Hearing before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 74th Cong. 72 (1937); Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1938:
Hearing before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 75th Cong. 281 (1938); Interior
Department Appropriation Bill for 1939: Hearing before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 75th Cong. 348 (1939); Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1940: Haring
before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 76th Cong. 421 (1940); Interior
Department Appropriation Bill for 1941: Hearing before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 76th Cong. 493 (1941).
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Authority for the purchase of water and power.2' However, as the federal
government's financial commitment to the project increased, itbecame less,
not more, willing to share the responsibility of administering the project
with the state. Secretary Ickes responded by stating, "The Central Valley
Project is a federal undertaking to be administered in accordance with
Reclamation Law."'
Reclamation law required that repayment contracts be made only
with agencies that had the power directly to assess and to create liens on the
property of water users.' While the Authority did not have this power, the
local water districts did have this power under the Wright Act;' The shift
toward greater federal control is evident in the 1941 House appropriations
bill. It stated,
The CVP is being constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation
and repayments will be provided for under contracts with
persons, firms, and corporations, to be hereafter made
pursuant to the reclamation law and amendments, and from
revenues derived from sale of surplus power to be generated
at Shasta Dam.'
Unlike the earlier bills, there is no mention of a cooperative relationship
with the State Water Authority.
The battle between the state and the federal governments for
control of the project directed attention away from the task of contracting
with the water users. The first water district contract was not signed until
1945,11 twelve years after President Roosevelt authorized the initial funding
for the project. The majority of the contracts were not signed until the early
195os." The chosen institutional structure, in which the Bureau created a
separate contract for each individual water district, increased the costs of
developing markets for CVP water. However, the Bureau was less
concerned with the long-run adaptability of the system than with the
immediate task of contracting with the water users. The least-cost solution
was to contract with the existing water districts. The contracts needed to
provide the water users with assurance that their rights would be secure,
201. MONmT MRY&CIAwSONsuprnote 166,at95-96(summarizing letter from Governor
Olson to Secretary Ickes on Feb. 15,1939).
202. Id. at 96 (quoting Letter from Secretary Ickes to Governor Olson on April 13,1939).
203. 32 Stat. 388.
204. 1887 Cal. Stat., & 34.
205. Interior Department Appropriation Billfor 1942: Hearing before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 77th Cong. 738 (1942).
206. CLAiR ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY FRojscT DocuMENTs PAr Two: OPERATiNG
Documem, H.R. Doc. No. 85-246, at 79-82 (1957).
207. Id. at 82.
208. Id. at 79-240.
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and they needed to provide the Bureau with a long-run stream of revenues
from water sales. To achieve security in rights and in repayment, both sides
had an incentive to establish rules restricting water transfers.
Contracts between the Bureau and the C-BT water users were not
based on the existing institutional structure, as in California. Rather, a new
water district, the NCWCD, was established to contract with the Bureau
and the water users.' This outcome reflects the fact that the delegation of
authority between the state and federal governments and the system of
repayment were resolved before construction of the C-BT began. In sharp
contrast to its relaxed treatment of the repayment contract in the CVP, the
Bureau required that the NCWCD sign a repayment contract before
construction could begin.210 The Bureau's stricter treatment of the C-BT
reflected a change in Bureau policy; however, it also stemmed from
Colorado's weaker bargaining position.
The CVP promoters had held stronger cards when they obtained
federal aid in 1933. First, they could point to the passage of the Central
Valley Project Act in 1933 as evidence of statewide support for the CVP. The
C-BT, in contrast, had not yet been put before Colorado voters. Second,
California had already invested in detailed engineering studies that showed
that the CVP was feasible, whereas Colorado was trying to obtain federal
aid to conduct the initial surveys.2"' Third, under the Wright Act,
California's irrigation districts had the power to levy taxes.212 Thus, the
Bureau could use the existing institutional structure to contract with water
districts in California. Colorado did not have a law analogous to the Wright
Act, and therefore it did not have water districts with the ability to contract
directly with the Bureau.
The leaders of the NCWUA had both the opportunity and the need
to create a new institutional structure to contract with the Bureau to build
the C-BT. Under Colorado's existing institutional structure, each ditch
company would have had to contract separately with the government.2 3
The ditch company members would have had to mortgage their properties
to the NCWUA, which in turn would have contracted with the Bureau for
repayment of the project costs. Since the 1935 Water Conservation District
Law denied the NCWUA the right to levy taxes, 24 repayment would have
209. TYLER, supra note 89, at 58-80.
210. See DRLE, supra note 105, at 28.
211. The directors of the NCWUA entered into active negotiations with the Bureau in
September 1934. Secretary Ickes approved an allocation of $150,000 for a preliminary
engineering investigation of the project on July 26,1935. Norcross, supra note 14, at 29.
212. 1887 CaL Stat, ch. 34.
213. TYLER, supra note 89, at 58.
214. 1935 Colo. Sess. Laws c&. 145, § 8.
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had to be financed through water and hydroelectricity sales alone. Neither
the Bureau nor the leaders of the NCWUA believed this was possible.21
Drawing from court-tested legislation in California and Utah, the
lawyers for the NCWUA drew up plans that would enable Colorado to
form conservancy districts with taxing powers. 1' In May 1937, the Colorado
legislature passed the Water Conservancy District Act, which stated that
water conservancy districts could be established with the power to tax and
contract with the federal government.2" Two months later the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD) was established, and it
effectively replaced the NCWUA."8
In some respects, the Bureau shifted the financial risk of
construction to the NCWCD by requiring a repayment contract in advance.
However, the arrangement was actually advantageous to the NCWCD
because the contract established that the District's share of the total cost was
not to exceed $25,00,000".29 The actual cost was much higher.= The
NCWCD leaders recognized the advantage of having a well-defined
contract. A NCWCD report dated July 1, 1941 stated,
One main advantage of this plan is that it permits the District
to contract the sale, or allotment of the 310,000 acre-feet of
water, at a definite predetermined cost, whereas under the
usual Reclamation Bureau project, the final determination of
costs to be repaid by the water users is not fixed until the
project is completed and the construction cost is known.
The existence of the repayment contract also provided the NCWCD
with an incentive to begin contracting with the water users as soon as
possible. The directors of the NCWCD were concerned that the Bureau
would not sign the repayment contract unless they demonstrated that there
was sufficient demand for the future C-BT water.m To demonstrate
demand, the NCWCD began accepting petitions for allotments during the
215. TYLER, supra note 89, at 58-59.
216. 1d. at 58-59. See Metropolitan Water Districts Act, 1935 Utah Laws ch. 110; Act of June
13,1929,1929 Cal. Stat. 1613.
217. The Water Conservancy MOt Act, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 266, § 15.
218. It was debated whether one conservancy district should exist for the whole state or
whether there should be regional districts. Proponents of the regional district plan prevailed,
because regional districts were perceived to be more politically palatable; however,
conservancy districts had to contain both agricultural and urban landowners and satisfy
minimum size requirements.
219. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMAION, SYNOPSIS OF REPOrr ON COLORADO-BIG THOMPSON
PROiECT, PLAN OP DEvELoPmENT AND COsr EgrDAATE, S. Doc. No. 75-80 (1937).
220. DILLE, supra note 105, at 65-66.
221. DILLE, supra note 194, at 7.
222. DILLE, supra note 105, at 28.
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summer of 193 8.' The price of allotments was set at $1.50 per acre-foot per
annum.2 By 1957, 2,631 contracts, representing 64 percent of the project
water, were signed between the NCWCD and individual landowners.'
While it was possible for a ditch company to contract for an allotment of
water, the NCWCD leaders reasoned that the benefits would be greater and
the chance of repayment higher if water were allotted to individual
landowners. This preference for contracting with individuals facilitated
the development of markets for C-BT water.'
E. Origins of the Excess Lands Provision
The way in which the Bureau handled the repayment contract in
Colorado versus California impacted the treatment of the excess lands
provision in each project. Because the NCWCD had to gain voter approval
for the repayment contract in advance of construction, the Colorado
delegation in Congress was provided with strong incentive to lobby for
exemption from the excess lands provision. It argued that the excess lands
provision did not apply to the C-BT because of the supplemental nature of
the proposed water project.' The C-BT received exemption in May 1938,
just one month before the repayment contract was put before the voters.'
Once large landowners learned that the C-BT would be exempt from the
160-acre limitation rule, they realized the project could benefit them." If the
C-BT had been subject to the excess lands provision, it is unlikely that the
voters would have approved the repayment contract and ultimately the
project might not have been built.
Since the CVP water users were not required to approve a
repayment contract in advance of construction, the project's sponsors could
downplay the fact that reclamation law required that the CVP would be
subject to the excess lands provision. Their main objective in the short-run
was to secure funding for construction of the project, and each year they
had to lobby Congress for additional appropriations. 2 They may have
223. DnE, supra note 194, at 8.
224. Id. at 7.
225. The remaining 36 percent of the water was allocated as follows: 14 percent to
municipalities, 2 percent to ditch companies, and 20 percent to corporations. Id. at 58.
226. Id. at 28.
227. Id. at 64.
228. TYLEF, supra note 89, at 92-93.
229. At the same time, water users on the Truckee Project in Nevada were able to obtain
exemption by arguing that a family farm in the high desert region needed tobe larger than 160
acres to be viable. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 260.
230. 83 Cong. Rec., 6876,7713,8323(1939).
231. TYLER, supra note 89, at 95. ,
232. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 251-52; WORSTM supra note 118, at 243-44.
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gambled that they would be able to obtain exemption from the provision
later on. Once the canals were completed, they may have believed the
Bureau would be in a poor position to deny their use to landowners because
repayment contracts were not signed.'
In 1943, once construction was well under way, the CVP's
supporters in Congress began a campaign to repeal the excess lands
provision.' They argued, as Colorado's delegation had, that the CVP
would provide supplemental water to established farms that were suffering
due to drought and depleted groundwater supplies.' However, they failed
to convince Congress to repeal the provision. As will be discussed below,
the C-BT supply really was more supplemental than the CVP supply.
Furthermore, the CVP was a much larger project requiring more federal
funding. Eastern representatives in Congress would only support such a
massive project if they believed the CVP would open up new areas for
small family farms rather than benefit California's large landowners.'
Having failed to obtain exemption for the excess lands provision,
Californians believed they could avoid it by returning control of the project
to the state. The following quote from the Central Valley Project Association
in its July 1944 newsletter is representative of the sentiment in the Valley at
the time:
One thing is certain and that is a strong fight will be made
against further federal encroachment upon the rights and
properties of California citizens and that every effort will be
made to effect a cooperative agreement whereby the control
of the Project operation and management will revert to local
authorities.W
In 1945, the state attempted a formal takeover. Secretary Ickes
stated that the Department of the Interior was prepared to withdraw from
the project if the state could prove itself capable of reimbursing the federal
government for its expenditures to date and of financing the remaining
construction.2m The Bureau had already invested $157,180,000, and
anticipated additional expenditures of $200,000,000 to complete the
project.' Daunted by a price tag of over $357,000,000, the state abandoned
its efforts to take over the project.2'
233. Lee, supra note 172, at 68.
234. Wozsrm, supra note 118, at 252-53.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 254.
237. MONTOOMUY &.CLAWSON, supra note 166, at 109.
238. Id. at 124-26 (quoting letter from Secretary Ickes to Governor Warrn, March 7,1945).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 127.
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F. Origins of Priority versus Proportional Rights
The sponsors of the CVP and C-BT emphasized that the projects
would provide supplemental water to land already under production.21
However, while the water provided by the C-BT legitimately was
supplemental, in many cases the CVP water provided a primary supply to
its users. The choice of priority rationing in the CVP and proportional
rationing in the C-BT was largely a function of this distinction between
primary and supplementary supplies.
"Supplemental" supposedly meant that (1) the lands to be served
already had an alternative (but inadequate) supply, and (2) no new lands
would come into production. In reality, neither of the above conditions held
in the CVP. First, some farms that were "already under production" had
such pitiful water supplies that they could only operate in the wettest of
years.242 For these farms, the CVP provided a primary water supply. The
CVP water also represented a primary supply for landowners that agreed
to accept CVP water in lieu of their pre-existing water supplies. Of
particular importance were the so-called "exchange contracts" established
with Miller & Lux, Inc. and other riparian landowners on the San Joaquin
River.43 For the riparian rights holders to agree to the exchange contracts,
they had to be convinced that their water supplies would be secure over
time, in drought years as well as wet years. To achieve this, the exchange
contractors were granted the highest priority, their water rights were tied
to the land and transfers were restricted.
Second, the CVP ultimately did bring new lands into production.
The push to expand the CVP was not surprising given the early history of
the State Water Project in Which Robert Marshall envisioned putting water
three feet deep on "12,000,000 acres of level land."2 During the 1940s, the
emphasis of the project shifted back to the view that it should provide both
supplemental water and water for land not yet under cultivation. The
California congressional delegation argued that the project should be
expanded to increase food production to aid the war effort.2' When the
CVP ultimately did deliver water to additional lands, new water districts
(e.g., Westlands Water District) were established to contract with the
Bureau. The Bureau then granted these new water districts junior rights.2"
241. HUNDLEY, supra note 112, at 251.
242. CLAIR ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY PRojEct DocumiNn PART ONE: AUTHORIZING
DOCmENTS, UP. Doc. No. 84-416, at 101 (1956).
243. Id. at 554-555.
244. Marshal, supra note 160, at 7.




Unlike the CVP, the C-BT really did provide a supplemental water
supply. When individuals and municipalities petitioned for C-BT
allotments, they had to prove that they already had an alternative water
source.' Because the water was supplemental, proportional rationing was
feasible. Senior appropriators would not have agreed to a proportional
system if they had been expected to substitute C-BT rights for their pre-
existing rights as did some of the landowners in California. However, as a
supplement to their existing rights, the proportional system was more
acceptable. The NCWCD's negotiations with landowners were also
simplified by the fact that they did not have to deal with riparian
landowners, since Colorado water law was based on the prior
appropriation doctrine.
The NCWCD leaders favored proportional rights because they
wanted a flexible system of water allocation in which water rights were
transferable. It is possible that the NCWCD leaders considered the long-run
benefits of being able to transfer water from agricultural to urban areas as
the state's population grew. Given their fear of losing water to the other
western states (especially California, which had a much larger population
and more political might), the NCWCD leaders wanted to secure water for
future development. While urban areas in California had taken local action
to secure water supplies for future growth, Colorado had a smaller urban
population base and fewer resources to develop local projects.'u It would
have been logical for Colorado to seek federal aid to develop the water
supplies necessary to enable future urban growth.
However, while they may have considered the long-run benefits of
a transferable rights system, the NCWCD reports in the 1940s and 1950s do
not mention these long-run benefits.'s The NCWCD directors were
primarily concerned with the short-run challenge of allocating the initial
water supplies.m Due to the wide differences in initial water supplies
throughout the District, and the lack of enthusiasm for the project among
some landowners, they wanted a distribution plan that would be flexible
and voluntary on the part of the users. As stated in a report by J.M Dille,
Secretary-Manager of the District,
The water supplies of the thousands of farms under the
various irrigation systems varied widely dependent annually
247. Most of the original water supply for the district came from mountain streams. Some
farms also pumped groundwater. DML, supra note 194 at 2, 8.
248. By the time the CVP was approved, Los Angeles had already completed the Owens
Valley Project, San Francisco had completed the Hetch Hetchy Project, and the East Bay cities
had completed the Mokelumne River Project
249. See generally DRI.2 supra note 194; DILLE, supra note 105; Norcross, supra note 14.
250. DiLLE, supra note 194, at 7.
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on the dates of decrees and the irregular supplies from the
local streams and reservoirs. Ownership of water rights or
ditch stock in proportion to acreage of farms was very
uneven. Management of many systems was in control of the
larger stockholders who rarely needed additional water and
were opposed to acquiring a "block" of water for their.,
company. Many leading irrigation men were doubtful of the
feasibility of the Project. These and other considerations
indicated a plan that would be flexible and voluntary and
would allow individual farmers to acquire the water they
needed.21
The District leaders sought a water allocation mechanism that
would allow them to spread the benefits of the project as evenly as possible.
Before accepting petitions for allotments, District staff collected data on
existing water supplies in the region.' They only accepted petitions for
allotments on land with a present "base" supply. Their policy was to
distribute the water allotments so that the C-BT water together with the pre-
existing supply would provide each farm with between two and two and
one-half acre-feet per acre.'
At its 1956 meeting, the board of directors of the NCWCD adopted
the rules and regulations for reallocating or transferring allotments.'
Copies of the "Rules and Regulations" were distributed to the water
users.' While the board of directors designed a system that would allow
transfer of the water allotments, it most likely did not anticipate the volume
of transfers that would occur in the future.
G. Origins of the C-BT Return Flow Rule
According to Colorado state law, return flows normally enter the
public domain and cannot be recovered by the original appropriatorP'
Despite this state law, the NCWCD argued that ownership of C-BT return
flows should be granted to the District instead of to downstream users. 2 7
The C-BT water was new to the eastern slope basin, and, therefore, the
NCWCD did not have to contend with any pre-existing claims to the return
251. DtuLE, supra note 105, at 56-57.
252. Duz, supra note 194, at 8.
253. Id.; DLLE, supra note 105, at 57.
254. DILL , supra note 105, at 64.
255. Id. at 64.
256. See, e.g., Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d
552 (Colo. 1947); Fort Collins Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 156 P.
140 (Colo. 1914); Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107 (Colo. 1913).
257. Article 19 of the Repayment Contract with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, reprinted
in, DtU.E, supra note 105, at 27.
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flows. The NCWCD's primary motive for gaining control of the return
flows was to protect the water against future federal interference. Secretary-
Manager Dille stated,
This important provision determines that the return flows
shall become part of the streams, subject to state
administration, and also forestalls any possible future
interference by federal agencies in state control of the water
supplies.2 %
While the NCWCD owned the rights, it allocated the return flows
to the irrigable lands already being partly supplied at no extra charge. Some
officials at the Bureau believed the District should collect revenue from the
beneficiaries of these flows, but the District negotiators felt that would
conflict with recognized state laws and be difficult to administer and
enforce.' Thus, the secondary water users obtained the benefits of the
return flows at no cost and upstream users were relieved from any liability
associated with any water transfers. 26
IV. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
This article highlights the importance of institutional path
dependence. The institutional structures adopted in the early stages of the
CVP and the C-BT were constrained by pre-existing property rights systems
and organizational structures. The choices were motivated by the short-
term goals of building consensus between diverse interest groups and
obtaining financing for construction, but they have had long-term impacts.
The institutions that govern water allocation in the C-BT enable market
transactions to occur at a relatively low cost, and have enabled northern
Colorado to adjust to short-run and long-run shifts in water supply and
demand. The CVP's water allocation institutions have been relatively
successful at establishing secure rights and mitigating third-party conflicts,
but these achievements have come at the expense of system flexibility.
Why have the water allocation institutions not been altered to allow
trading at a pace consistent with increases in scarcity? A principal reason
is the web of irreversible investments made by water users that are
conditional on current patterns of water allocation. Institutional reforms
would reallocate water among competing uses within agriculture and
between agriculture and urban areas. These geographic changes in water
use patterns would cause numerous types of irreversible investments to
258. DILLE, supra note 105, at 27.
259. Id.
260. Howe et al., Lsons, supra note 3, at 185-86.
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become unproductive, and force costly relocation of sectors of the
agricultural industry. For example, surface water users with senior rights
and a high degree of water supply reliability have made substantial
investments in perennial crops and specialized vegetable crops. Current
patterns of land allocation among crops affect the placement of crop-specific
service industries such as equipment dealers, irrigation engineers, and pest
management consultants. The agricultural labor force is specialized, and
key workers have settled in areas where the crops they know best are
grown. More important, though, is the network of processing and
distribution facilities that have evolved based on current water use and
cropping patterns.
If the CVP's water allocation institutions were to change to permit
trading, what would the new system look like? Is the C-BT an appropriate
model? As discussed in this article, there are some desirable aspects of the
C-BT system, but the CVP is a more complex project, covering a much
larger geographic area and delivering much more water to many more
users. The existence of one water district, the NCWCD, and the
proportional rationing system have facilitated trading within the C-BT. The
transaction costs of water trading in the CVP could be reduced if some of
the smaller water districts were consolidated to form larger regional
districts. Currently the water districts range from very large districts such
as Westlands Water District, which serves approximately 700 farmers, to
very small districts that serve only a handful of farmers. While a merger of
water districts might be feasible, a switch from priority to proportional
rationing in the CVP would be a more radical change. The high adjustment
costs and potential income transfers associated with such a dramatic shift
in property rights make such a change unlikely.
The most important factor enabling the development of water
markets in the C-BT may be its unique return flow rule. Critics of the C-BT
system may argue, however, that the rules allow trades to occur in which
the overall benefits do not outweigh the costs to third parties. Third party
effects are the biggest impediment to water trading in the CVP. A return
flow rule similar to the C-BT's is unlikely to be adopted in the CVP, but as
more trades occur and third-party impacts are resolved, there will be
precedent for future trades. Furthermore, as the potential gains from water
trades increase, water districts will have an incentive to invest in more
accurate water metering devices, and there will be increased pressure to
clarify groundwater rights and to meter groundwater use. These
developments will reduce the costs of measuring the third-party impacts
associated with water trades.
The acreage limitation rule in the CVP has not served its original
purpose, which was to promote small family farming. While the rule
appears to be enforced, in practice many large landowners get around it by
dividing 960-acre units among family members. As discussed, the acreage
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limitation rule contributes to the insecurity of property rights, and it
increases market transaction costs by forcing market participants to
consider the location of a trade in addition to the quantity of water traded.
The acreage limitation rule will not, however, disappear easily. Taxpayers
understandably object to large landowners receiving federally subsidized
water. From the landowners' perspective, the benefits of removing the law
may be perceived as small relative to the potentially high costs of bringing
the issue once again to the public's attention.
As described by North, institutions may evolve in response to
endogenous forces (adaptive efficiency) or exogenous forces (allocative
efficiency)."* Institutional change may be gradual and incremental, or it
may occur rapidly and be drastic in its form. The water allocation
institutions in the CVP and the C-BT have been relatively impervious to
change over time. However, two exogenous forces, growing urban water
demand and stress on the environment (combined with greater public
support for environmental protection), will continue to create pressure for
institutional change that allows the scarce water resources in Colorado and
California to be used more efficiently. When these external forces are
combined with the unpredictable occurrence of drought, a crisis
environment may make dramatic institutional change possible.
Historically, water shortages have been relieved through the
construction of new water supply projects rather than through institutional
changes that increasethe efficiency with which existing supplies are used.
However, due largely to environmental concerns, new water projects are
politically less feasible than in the past. Without the ability to relieve
scarcity through supply-side measures, institutional change is more likely.
In California, for example, the extended drought from 1987 to 1991 led to
the development of the State Water Bank and contributed to the passage of
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act in 1992.1 More recently, years
of above-normal rainfall have dampened pressures for institutional reform
in California.
Combined with the increasing scarcity of water, two other forces
may stimulate the development of water markets. The first is the tide of
deregulation that has swept other regulated industries in the United States,
including the airline, telecommunications, trucking, and natural gas
industries. Most recently, the electricity industry is undergoing radical
restructuring. California was the first state in the United States to enact
comprehensive electricity restructuring laws, and many other states have
261. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTh, INSlITuInONS, INSTTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7-10 (1990). Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time,
64 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1994).
262. See generally Howitt, supra note 11, at 357-71.
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followed California's lead.' Unlike the above industries, in which services
were provided by privately owned regulated firms, the CVP, the C-BT, and
most other major water project facilities in the United States are
government owned and operated. Nonetheless, while differences exist, the
success of deregulation in other industries is creating pressure to restructure
the water sector as well.
The second force working to enable the development of water
markets is the advancement in information technology. Computerized
trading systems have the potential to increase the flow of market
information and reduce the transaction costs associated with water trading.
In addition, computer networks make possible more complex trades over
long distances through improved management of water distribution
systems. The first electronic water marketing system, WaterLink, was
introduced in Westlands Water District in 1994.2" WaterLink, designed by
a team of researchers at the University of California through a Challenge
Grant funded by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, gives farmers in
Westlands the ability to obtain water market information and to buy or sell
water using their home computers.' After a series of meetings with
farmers and water district managers, the research team convinced
Westlands to test the system'2 6 Once Westlands growers and water district
managers were exposed to the system, they realized its potential and
lobbied for a more advanced trading system.' 7 Thus, 'a process of
endogenous change began to occur after the initial introduction of
WaterLink. The prototype WaterLink system has since been expanded to
include other water districts in the CVP, and its capabilities have been
expanded.'
VIl. CONCLUSIONS
This article provided a comparative analysis of the water markets
in the CVP and the C-BT. The article examined why an active water market,
including both rental and sales transactions, has developed in the C-BT,
while a similar market, despite a similar degree of water scarcity, has failed
263. See generally Paul L Joskow, Restructuring, Cmpetition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S.
Electricity Sector, J. ECON. PERsP., Summer 1997, at 119; PMTU FOX-PENNER, EECRI UILITY
RSTmucURING: A GuwE To THE COmpmw ERA (1998).
264. Janis Olmstead et aL, Water Marketing in the '90s Entering the Electronic Age, CHOICES,
Third Quarter 1997, at 15, 16.
265. Id. at 15.
266. Id. at 18.
267. Id. at 17.
268. On more recent versions of the WaterLink system, see generally Sunding, supra note
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to develop in the CVP. The analysis showed that four key institutional
features-the water district structures, the rationing mechanism, the return
flow rules, and the acreage limitation rule--cause the transaction costs of
water transfers to be significantly higher in the CVP than in the C-BT.
This research revealed that the two projects adopted different
institutional structures from the beginning and the institutions have been
relatively impervious to change over time. Thus, the markets today are
largely a result of institutional path dependence. The institutions that were
adopted were a function of the pre-existing systems of water rights in each
state and reflected the short-term objectives of obtaining political support
and federal financing for the projects. The founders of each project were
concerned with the initial allocation of water rights and with creating
security of tenure. They did not appear to be concerned with the ability of
the water projects to adapt to long-run changes in water demand through
water markets.
The institutions have changed little over time in response to
increasing water scarcity. Stress on the systems has been relieved through
new water supply projects rather than through institutional change. As new
water supply projects are now prohibitively expensive, at least in the near
term, we should expect to see investments in institutional change that
facilitate water trading and increase the efficiency with which existing
supplies are used. Institutional change, when it does occur, is likely to be
drastic as opposed to gradual. Given the high costs of achieving consensus
among heterogeneous users and affected parties, the trigger event for
change may be a crisis event such as drought or a threat to endangered
species that increases the cost of maintaining the status quo to the point
where the benefits of change outweigh the costs.
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